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Abstract:	  In	  this	  field	  guide,	  I	  distinguish	  five	  separate	  senses	  with	  which	  the	  term	  ‘mechanism’	  is	  used	  in	  contemporary	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  Many	  of	  these	  senses	  have	  overlapping	  areas	  of	  application	  but	  involve	  distinct	  philosophical	  claims	  and	  characterize	  the	  target	  mechanisms	  in	  relevantly	  different	  ways.	  This	  field	  guide	  will	  clarify	  the	  key	  features	  of	  each	  sense	  and	  introduce	  some	  main	  debates,	  distinguishing	  those	  that	  transpire	  within	  a	  given	  sense	  from	  those	  that	  are	  best	  understood	  as	  concerning	  distinct	  senses.	  The	  ‘new	  mechanisms’	  sense	  is	  at	  the	  center	  of	  most	  of	  these	  contemporary	  debates,	  and	  will	  be	  treated	  at	  greater	  length;	  subsequent	  senses	  of	  mechanism	  will	  be	  primarily	  distinguished	  from	  this	  one.	  In	  part	  I	  of	  this	  paper,	  I	  distinguish	  two	  senses	  of	  the	  term	  ‘mechanism’,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  explicitly	  hierarchical	  and	  nested	  in	  character,	  such	  that	  any	  given	  mechanism	  is	  comprised	  of	  smaller	  sub-­‐mechanisms,	  in	  turn	  comprised	  of	  yet	  smaller	  sub-­‐sub-­‐mechanisms,	  and	  so	  on.	  While	  both	  of	  the	  senses	  discussed	  here	  are	  anti-­‐reductive,	  they	  differ	  in	  their	  focus	  on	  scientific	  practice	  versus	  metaphysics,	  in	  the	  degree	  of	  regularity	  they	  attribute	  to	  mechanisms,	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  relationships	  to	  the	  discussions	  of	  mechanisms	  in	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy	  and	  science.	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   0)	  Introduction	  
	  	  Talk	  of	  mechanisms	  is	  central	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  recent	  debates	  in	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  For	  those	  working	  outside	  of	  these	  debates,	  it	  can	  be	  difficult	  to	  get	  a	  clear	  sense	  of	  what	  all	  the	  talk	  of	  ‘new	  mechanisms’	  is	  about.	  This	  two-­‐part	  field	  guide	  is	  intended	  to	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  main	  new	  sense	  of	  mechanism	  that	  has	  been	  the	  primary	  focus	  of	  discussion,	  and	  to	  distinguish	  this	  new	  sense	  from	  other	  related	  but	  relevantly	  different	  senses	  in	  which	  the	  term	  mechanism	  appears	  in	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  This	  field	  guide	  begins	  by	  a	  concise	  overview	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  ‘new	  mechanisms’,	  and	  then	  turns	  to	  distinguishing	  and	  comparing	  other	  notions	  of	  mechanism	  to	  this	  one.	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  This	  field	  guide	  offers	  taxonomic	  classifications	  of	  species	  of	  mechanism,	  with	  key	  distinguishing	  markings	  of	  each	  species.	  These	  taxonomic	  distinctions	  have	  not	  been	  utilized	  in	  debate	  involving	  ‘mechanisms’	  but	  are	  motivated	  out	  of	  the	  kinds	  of	  characterizations	  and	  debates	  that	  have	  multiplied	  on	  this	  topic	  recently.	  In	  elaborating	  each	  distinct	  sense,	  I	  am	  thereby	  arguing	  that	  each	  involves	  a	  unique	  set	  of	  ontological,	  methodological,	  explanatory,	  and	  anti-­‐/reductive	  commitments.	  Claims	  that	  are	  true	  of	  one	  sense	  will	  fail	  of	  others;	  as	  such,	  the	  senses	  are	  not	  interchangeable,	  even	  though	  they	  are	  often	  presumed	  to	  be	  (especially	  mechanism1	  and	  mechanism2).	  	  	  The	  division	  between	  parts	  I	  and	  II	  classifies	  types	  of	  mechanisms	  in	  terms	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  are	  explicitly	  anti-­‐reductive.	  Here	  in	  part	  I,	  I	  focus	  on	  two	  senses	  that	  include	  an	  explicitly	  tiered	  ontology	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  reduction.	  These	  approaches	  to	  mechanisms	  concern	  ways	  to	  individuate	  and	  connect	  levels,	  especially	  but	  not	  limited	  to	  levels	  as	  they	  are	  studied	  in	  the	  sciences,	  while	  rejecting	  that	  this	  constitutes	  a	  reduction	  of	  higher	  levels	  to	  lower	  levels.	  This	  anti-­‐reductive	  approach	  to	  mechanisms	  aims	  to	  provide	  explanatory	  autonomy	  to	  the	  so-­‐called	  special	  sciences,	  while	  still	  grounding	  their	  objects	  of	  investigation	  firmly	  in	  the	  physical	  world.	  These	  two	  senses	  can	  be	  distinguished	  by	  differing	  in	  3	  major	  characteristics:	  the	  first	  emphasizes	  the	  role	  of	  mechanisms	  in	  various	  aspects	  of	  scientific	  practice,	  while	  the	  second	  emphasizes	  a	  metaphysical	  role	  for	  mechanisms;	  the	  first	  attributes	  some	  degree	  of	  regularity	  to	  mechanisms,	  while	  the	  second	  allows	  any	  unique	  causal	  chain	  to	  count	  as	  a	  mechanism;	  and	  while	  the	  first	  offers	  something	  novel	  to	  the	  ongoing	  philosophical	  discussion	  of	  mechanisms,	  the	  second	  is	  more	  closely	  aligned	  with	  the	  historical	  notion	  of	  mechanism.	  These	  characteristics	  are	  mutually	  supportive;	  for	  instance,	  an	  emphasis	  on	  scientific	  practice	  leads	  clearly	  to	  a	  focus	  on	  regularities	  as	  targets	  for	  experimentation,	  while	  an	  emphasis	  on	  metaphysics	  connects	  much	  more	  closely	  to	  the	  historical	  discussion	  of	  mechanisms	  in	  natural	  philosophy.	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Each	  section	  of	  this	  field	  guide	  will	  begin	  by	  briefly	  characterizing	  the	  most	  salient	  philosophical	  features	  of	  the	  relevant	  species	  of	  mechanism,	  including	  the	  kind	  of	  discussion	  in	  which	  it	  most	  frequently	  appears.	  I	  will	  then	  briefly	  discuss	  the	  ontological	  commitments	  of	  each	  sense,	  their	  methodological	  implications,	  and	  their	  role	  in	  explanation,	  respectively.	  Each	  section	  includes	  a	  comparison	  distinguishing	  it	  from	  other	  related	  senses	  of	  mechanism.	  	  	  	  
1) Mechanism1:	  Mechanisms	  as	  integral	  to	  scientific	  practice	  	  This	  is	  the	  ‘new	  mechanism’	  approach	  that	  is	  arguably	  the	  primary	  sense	  of	  the	  term	  mechanism	  in	  recent	  discussion.	  This	  species	  of	  mechanism	  is	  very	  commonly	  found	  in	  discussions	  of	  explanation	  in	  the	  sciences,	  as	  distinct,	  for	  instance,	  from	  explanation	  in	  history	  or	  of	  action.	  It	  comprises	  several	  claims.	  One	  is	  the	  ontological	  claim	  that	  the	  phenomena	  studied	  by	  many	  sciences,	  especially	  so-­‐called	  higher-­‐level	  sciences	  like	  biology,	  have	  a	  particular	  hierarchical	  structure	  comprised	  of	  nested	  levels.	  Each	  level	  involves	  entities	  organized	  in	  various	  ways	  and	  connected	  via	  causal	  interactions	  or	  activities,	  constituting	  or	  giving	  rise	  to	  a	  pattern	  that	  recurs	  under	  specific	  identifiable	  circumstances.	  These	  patterns	  are	  the	  regularities	  that	  constitute	  the	  phenomena	  studied	  by	  these	  sciences.	  Such	  mechanisms	  provide	  non-­‐arbitrary	  ways	  to	  divide	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  into	  levels	  of	  physical	  size	  and	  organization,	  and	  to	  understand	  the	  connections	  between	  different	  levels,	  without	  having	  to	  reduce	  or	  eliminate	  higher	  levels	  or	  treat	  them	  as	  merely	  apparent	  or	  epiphenomenal.	  	  	  A	  second	  claim	  is	  that	  the	  methodology	  of	  many	  sciences	  reflects	  this	  ontological	  structure	  of	  their	  target	  phenomena,	  by	  isolating	  consistent	  patterns	  or	  regularities	  in	  the	  world	  and	  then	  decomposing	  them	  into	  constituent	  entities,	  causal	  connections,	  and	  spatio-­‐temporal	  organization.	  The	  emphasis	  is	  on	  the	  practice	  of	  science.	  A	  third	  claim,	  central	  to	  this	  sense,	  concerns	  explanation	  in	  such	  sciences,	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namely,	  that	  the	  explanations	  they	  offer	  reflect	  this	  ontology.	  Explanations	  are	  of	  regularly	  recurring	  phenomena	  in	  the	  physical	  world	  that	  are	  the	  end	  product	  of,	  or	  are	  constituted	  by,	  the	  operation	  of	  such	  mechanisms;	  such	  regularities	  are	  to	  be	  explained	  by	  providing	  details	  about	  the	  mechanism(s)	  responsible	  for	  producing	  them.	  	  	  The	  trajectory	  leading	  up	  to	  this	  sense	  of	  mechanism	  is	  familiar.	  As	  logical	  empiricism	  waned	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  philosophers	  of	  science	  focused	  on	  deduction	  from	  universal	  laws	  as	  the	  primary	  form	  of	  explanation	  in	  science	  (e.g.	  Hempel	  and	  Oppenheim	  1948,	  Hempel	  1963).	  On	  this	  view,	  an	  explanation	  involves	  a	  general	  law	  plus	  a	  set	  of	  initial	  conditions,	  from	  which	  the	  explanandum	  could	  be	  deduced.1	  A	  variety	  of	  problems	  plagued	  the	  deductive-­‐nomological	  account	  of	  explanation	  (see,	  for	  instance,	  Salmon	  1978).	  One	  clear	  issue	  was	  the	  apparent	  lack	  of	  suitable	  laws	  in	  biology	  to	  serve	  in	  a	  deduction.	  This	  posed	  an	  unfortunate	  dilemma:	  either	  biology	  and	  related	  sciences	  do	  not	  really	  explain,	  or	  the	  D-­‐N	  account	  applies	  only	  narrowly	  to	  some	  explanations,	  mainly	  in	  physics.	  Laws	  can	  be	  reconstrued	  in	  ways	  that	  render	  them	  more	  applicable	  in	  biological	  sciences	  (Mitchell	  1997),	  but	  many	  still	  found	  the	  D-­‐N	  model	  of	  explanation	  unsatisfactory	  in	  biological	  contexts.	  	  This	  ‘new	  mechanism’	  approach	  arose	  in	  response	  to	  many	  of	  the	  issues	  raised	  with	  the	  D-­‐N	  model	  of	  explanation.	  It	  differed	  from	  the	  D-­‐N	  account	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  it	  took	  the	  sciences	  to	  be	  investigating,	  how	  those	  investigations	  generally	  proceed,	  and	  the	  explanatory	  results	  of	  those	  investigations.	  Ontologically,	  it	  shifted	  the	  emphasis	  away	  from	  universal	  laws	  and	  nomic	  necessity,	  towards	  recurrent	  patterns	  of	  causal	  structure,	  with	  a	  much	  more	  limited	  scope	  of	  generalizability.	  Methodologically,	  it	  took	  the	  sciences	  to	  be	  engaged	  in	  finding	  more	  and	  more	  detail,	  by	  targeting	  and	  decomposing	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  support	  limited	  regularities,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  deductive	  arguments	  that	  rely	  on	  universal	  laws	  to	  show	  the	  necessity	  of	  the	  explanandum	  also	  have	  an	  inductive	  counterpart,	  relying	  on	  statistical	  generalizations	  that	  raise	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  explanandum.	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rather	  than	  seeking	  ever	  broader	  and	  more	  abstract	  generalizations.	  These	  ontological	  and	  methodological	  views	  support	  an	  account	  of	  explanation	  that	  eschews	  propositionally	  structured	  laws	  and	  logically	  valid	  arguments,	  instead	  relying	  on	  mechanism	  models,	  of	  varying	  levels	  of	  descriptive	  specificity,	  involving	  real	  entities,	  their	  activities,	  and	  their	  organization	  into	  coherent	  processes	  that	  recur	  under	  appropriate	  circumstances.	  	  	  Finally,	  this	  new	  sense	  of	  mechanism	  is	  deeply	  anti-­‐reductionist:	  science	  may	  uncover	  explanatory	  or	  ontological	  connections	  between	  higher	  and	  lower	  levels,	  but	  does	  not	  thereby	  either	  eliminate	  or	  reduce	  the	  higher	  levels	  thus	  connected	  (Wimsatt	  1994).	  The	  hierarchically	  structured,	  anti-­‐reductionist	  approach	  involved	  in	  mechanisms1	  holds	  that	  science	  provides	  genuine	  explanations	  that	  “bottom	  out”	  without	  having	  to	  be	  grounded	  in	  some	  ultimate	  fundamental	  level	  (Machamer,	  Darden,	  and	  Craver	  2000).	  Higher-­‐level	  explanations	  are	  not	  viewed	  as	  placeholders	  for	  some	  ‘real’,	  microphysical,	  explanation;	  the	  focus	  is	  instead	  on	  integrating	  and	  connecting	  levels	  (Glennan	  1995,	  2002,	  2005;	  Darden	  and	  Craver	  2009).	  Even	  if	  mechanisms	  in	  biology	  are	  ultimately	  composed	  of	  sub-­‐sub-­‐submechanisms	  in	  physics,	  this	  does	  not	  meant	  that	  biological	  phenomena	  explained	  by	  such	  mechanisms	  are	  thereby	  reduced	  to	  the	  lower-­‐level	  mechanisms.	  	  	  This	  anti-­‐reductive	  stance	  has	  ontological	  consequences.	  Methodologies	  for	  investigating	  levels	  of	  recurrent	  mechanisms	  can	  proceed	  in	  relative	  autonomy,	  neither	  affirming	  nor	  denying	  any	  ultimate	  ontological	  relationship	  between	  different	  branches	  of	  science,	  scientific	  theories,	  or	  phenomena.	  Mechanism1	  thus	  imposes	  some	  distance	  between,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  normative	  epistemological	  or	  methodological	  claims	  about	  the	  most	  effective	  ways	  to	  investigate	  the	  world,	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  underlying	  nature	  of	  that	  world.	  It	  is	  not	  explicitly	  anti-­‐metaphysical,	  but	  rather	  metaphysically	  agnostic.	  The	  anti-­‐reductive	  character	  of	  mechanism1	  allows	  us	  to	  make	  methodological	  recommendations	  about	  investigating	  the	  world	  (see	  especially	  Bechtel	  and	  Richardson	  1992	  and	  Darden	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2002)	  without	  thereby	  committing	  ourselves	  to	  a	  single	  account	  of	  what	  that	  world	  is	  like.	  	  	  Mechanism1	  is	  often	  elaborated	  as	  part	  of	  a	  detailed	  look	  at	  the	  actual	  investigatory	  practices	  of	  the	  sciences,	  especially	  biological	  sciences.	  Bechtel	  and	  Richardson	  (1993;	  see	  also	  Bechtel	  and	  Abrahamsen	  2005)	  characterize	  scientific	  discovery	  in	  the	  biological	  sciences	  in	  terms	  of	  localizing	  and	  decomposing	  mechanisms.	  Instead	  of	  searching	  for	  universal	  laws,	  many	  scientists	  are	  engaged	  in	  the	  task	  of	  identifying	  regular	  phenomena	  and	  the	  precise	  circumstances	  under	  which	  they	  transpire,	  and	  the	  locus	  of	  control	  by	  which	  mechanisms	  can	  be	  manipulated.	  Some	  target	  regularity	  must	  first	  be	  delineated	  –	  what	  is	  the	  phenomenon	  to	  be	  explained?	  This	  often	  proceeds	  by	  investigating	  the	  precise	  spatio-­‐temporal	  boundaries	  of	  the	  regularity,	  including	  parameter	  values	  that	  modulate	  how	  it	  occurs	  and	  supporting	  environmental	  factors	  outside	  of	  the	  mechanism	  itself.	  Localized	  mechanisms	  can	  be	  decomposed	  into	  constituent	  elements	  or	  components,	  their	  interactions,	  and	  the	  organization	  of	  those	  elements	  into	  a	  coherent	  and	  re-­‐identifiable	  process.	  Once	  localized	  and	  decomposed,	  the	  delineated	  mechanism	  explains	  why	  the	  identified	  regularity	  occurs	  as	  it	  does,	  under	  the	  conditions	  that	  it	  does.	  	  	  The	  way	  in	  which	  mechanisms1	  are	  investigated	  shapes	  the	  kinds	  of	  explanations	  in	  which	  those	  mechanisms	  figure.	  Explanations	  can	  involve	  a	  greater	  or	  lesser	  degree	  of	  specificity,	  depending	  on	  the	  state	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  or	  the	  context	  in	  which	  a	  given	  explanation	  is	  provided.	  For	  example,	  Craver	  and	  Darden	  (2001),	  Darden	  (2002),	  Craver	  (2007),	  and	  Darden	  (2008)	  offer	  mechanism	  sketches,	  mechanism	  schemata,	  and	  fully	  developed	  mechanisms	  as	  identifiable	  stages	  involved	  in	  the	  discovery	  of	  mechanisms.	  	  	   Mechanism	  schemata	  are	  abstract	  descriptions	  of	  mechanisms	  that	  can	  be	  instantiated	  to	  yield	  descriptions	  of	  particular	  mechanisms.	  The	  term	  
mechanism	  schemata	  is	  fitting	  because	  their	  components	  are	  placeholders	  that	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can	  be	  filled	  in	  with	  detailed	  stages	  between	  the	  setup	  and	  termination.	  …	  Mechanism	  sketches,	  in	  contrast	  to	  mechanism	  schemata,	  are	  abstract	  descriptions	  of	  mechanisms	  that	  cannot	  yet	  be	  filled	  in	  (Craver	  and	  Darden	  2001,	  120).	  	  	  Darden	  calls	  these	  distinctions	  “advisory”:	  neither	  simply	  descriptive,	  nor	  purely	  prescriptive,	  they	  provide	  a	  set	  of	  terms	  and	  concepts	  for	  scientists	  that	  can	  be	  genuinely	  useful	  in	  structuring	  research,	  while	  recognizing	  that	  these	  terms	  and	  concepts	  have	  been	  developed	  by	  considering	  what	  many	  scientists	  are	  already	  doing.	  	  	  Schemata	  and	  sketches	  vary	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  detail	  they	  fill	  in	  about	  the	  mechanism(s)	  in	  questions	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  possibility	  they	  leave	  open	  for	  how	  that	  mechanism	  might	  be	  instantiated.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  a	  mechanism	  sketch	  places	  constraints	  on	  the	  kind	  of	  mechanism	  that	  could	  instantiate	  it.	  The	  first	  stage	  of	  discovery	  of	  a	  mechanism	  may	  consist	  in	  such	  a	  sketch	  that	  guides	  further	  research	  by	  narrowing	  the	  range	  of	  possible	  kinds	  of	  mechanisms	  to	  be	  investigated.	  A	  fuller	  set	  of	  constraints	  may	  be	  provided	  by	  mechanism	  schemata,	  where	  components	  and	  their	  connecting	  activities	  have	  sufficient	  constraints	  placed	  on	  them	  that	  researchers	  can	  begin	  filling	  in	  physical	  details	  for	  particular	  mechanisms.	  A	  single	  schema	  may	  be	  instantiated	  by	  several	  distinct	  mechanisms	  that	  fill	  in	  the	  placeholder	  components	  with	  different	  entities	  or	  activities	  that	  fulfill	  broadly	  similar	  functions.	  	  This	  highlights	  the	  need	  to	  distinguish	  between	  mechanisms1,	  which	  are	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  models	  of	  mechanisms1	  (e.g.	  Glennan	  2005,	  Illari	  and	  Williamson	  2010).	  This	  distinction	  figures	  in	  the	  debate	  of	  what	  it	  is	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  mechanisms1	  are	  explanatory.	  Drawing	  from	  Salmon	  (1984),	  the	  ontic	  conception	  of	  mechanisms	  holds	  that	  mechanisms	  are	  represented	  in	  models	  and	  theories	  in	  the	  sciences,	  but	  are	  not	  identical	  with	  those	  representational	  devices.	  They	  are	  instead	  ‘out	  there’	  in	  the	  world.	  This	  makes	  an	  important	  difference	  when	  considered	  in	  terms	  of	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explanation:	  do	  semantic	  or	  syntactic	  relationships	  between	  elements	  of	  a	  model-­‐theoretic	  representation	  do	  the	  explanatory	  work	  in	  their	  own	  right,	  or	  do	  they	  merely	  point	  to	  or	  exhibit	  the	  causal	  relationships	  in	  the	  world	  that	  do	  the	  explanatory	  work?	  Wright	  (2012)	  argues	  against	  this	  ontic	  conception,	  holding	  instead	  that	  explanation	  is	  a	  communicative	  process	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  understanding	  which	  must	  thus	  involve	  models	  of	  mechanisms.	  Many	  models	  of	  mechanisms1	  are	  not	  propositionally	  structured,	  but	  are	  instead	  conveyed	  using	  diagrammatic	  or	  visual	  forms	  of	  representation	  (Darden	  and	  Craver	  2002,	  Perini	  2005a,	  2005b).	  This	  debate	  concerns	  the	  role	  that	  mechanism1	  plays	  in	  explanation:	  do	  mechanism	  explanations	  involve	  physical	  mechanisms	  themselves,	  or	  models	  of	  those	  mechanisms?	  It	  has	  consequences	  that	  reach	  beyond	  the	  discussion	  simply	  of	  mecahnisms1,	  however,	  by	  undermining	  general	  accounts	  of	  explanation	  that	  rely	  on,	  for	  instance,	  logical	  entailment	  relationships	  between	  premises	  in	  arguments	  to	  characterize	  explanation	  (Strevens	  2008).	  If	  mechanism1	  models	  figure	  in	  explanations,	  diagrammatic	  or	  other	  visual	  representations	  of	  mechanisms1	  lack	  the	  requisite	  propositional	  structure	  to	  figure	  in	  such	  logical	  relationships;	  if	  physical	  mechanisms1	  themselves	  figure,	  they	  lack	  such	  features	  even	  more	  obviously.	  	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  mechanisms1	  constrain	  ontological	  commitments	  is	  also	  a	  point	  of	  dispute.	  Some	  of	  these	  debates	  are	  best	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  univocal	  sense	  of	  mechanism	  (namely,	  mechanism1),	  while	  others	  involve	  tension	  between	  different	  senses	  of	  mechanism.	  Two	  examples	  of	  intra-­‐sense	  debate	  concern	  how	  to	  best	  characterize	  the	  internal	  structure	  of	  mechanisms,	  and	  the	  extent	  of	  ontological	  commitments	  entailed	  by	  mechanism1.	  For	  the	  first	  example,	  there	  are	  disagreements	  about	  how	  to	  best	  describe	  the	  process	  of	  a	  mechanism	  in	  action.	  Machamer,	  Darden,	  and	  Craver	  (2000)	  utilize	  start-­‐up	  conditions	  that	  trigger	  the	  mechanism,	  and	  termination	  conditions	  that	  are	  the	  last	  stage	  within	  the	  mechanism.	  Using	  the	  example	  of	  circadian	  rhythms,	  Bechtel	  and	  Abrahamsen	  (2010)	  argue	  instead	  that	  mechanisms	  are	  often	  cyclical,	  and	  therefore	  lack	  clear	  start-­‐up	  or	  termination	  conditions.	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The	  second	  example	  involves	  disagreement	  about	  how	  much	  ontological	  commitment	  should	  accompany	  mechanism1.	  While	  some	  authors	  who	  defend	  this	  new	  mechanism	  approach	  do	  so	  in	  an	  ontologically	  agnostic	  way	  (for	  instance,	  Bechtel	  and	  Richardson	  1993),	  mechanism1	  is	  clearly	  well-­‐suited	  to	  certain	  kinds	  of	  ontological	  commitments.2	  For	  instance,	  Machamer,	  Darden,	  and	  Craver	  (2000)	  argue	  for	  a	  dualistic	  entity-­‐activity	  ontology	  to	  ground	  the	  mechanistic1	  account	  of	  explanation.	  They	  characterize	  mechanisms	  as	  “entities	  and	  activities	  organized	  such	  that	  they	  are	  productive	  of	  regular	  changes	  from	  start	  or	  set-­‐up	  conditions	  to	  finish	  or	  termination	  conditions”	  (2000,	  3).	  Mechanisms1	  are	  organized	  chains	  of	  entities	  connected	  via	  productive	  activities	  of	  those	  entities;	  the	  organized	  activities	  provide	  both	  continuity	  to	  the	  mechanism	  and	  regularity	  of	  operation	  (ibid.).	  Phenomena	  to	  be	  explained	  via	  mechanisms	  are	  either	  the	  final	  product	  that	  results	  once	  termination	  conditions	  are	  reached	  or	  a	  higher-­‐level	  regularity	  to	  which	  the	  mechanism	  gives	  rise.	  Thus,	  mechanisms	  can	  explain	  (at	  least)	  two	  ontological	  kinds	  of	  target	  phenomenon.	  One	  kind	  is	  the	  effects	  of	  causal	  relationships,	  where	  the	  explanandum	  is	  the	  final	  stage	  in	  an	  often	  complex	  causal	  chain	  at	  the	  same	  level	  as	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  entities	  and	  activities	  in	  the	  mechanism.	  The	  second	  kind	  is	  phenomena	  at	  a	  higher	  level	  than	  the	  explanans,	  where	  causal	  activities	  connect	  the	  entities	  at	  a	  lower	  level,	  and	  the	  entire	  mechanism’s	  operation	  constitutes	  the	  higher-­‐level	  phenomenon.	  	  	  Machamer,	  Darden,	  and	  Craver	  (2000)	  explicitly	  aim	  to	  offer	  a	  view	  of	  mechanisms1	  that	  is	  compatible	  with	  Salmon’s	  (1984)	  process	  account	  of	  causation.	  In	  contrast	  to	  their	  commitment	  to	  the	  process	  account,	  the	  causal	  relationships	  binding	  mechanisms1	  together	  could	  be	  construed	  in	  terms	  of	  counterfactuals,	  or	  dispositions,	  or	  capacities	  (e.g.	  Ilari	  and	  Williamson	  2010).	  Accordingly,	  we	  see	  that	  mechanism1	  is	  not	  itself	  an	  account	  of	  causation	  (this	  will	  be	  more	  fully	  explored	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  mechanisms1	  are	  compatible	  with	  just	  any	  ontology:	  the	  epistemological	  or	  methodological	  features	  of	  the	  new	  mechanisms	  approach	  place	  compatibility	  constraints	  on	  ontological	  commitments.	  Rather,	  the	  point	  here	  is	  that	  these	  constraints	  are	  not	  enough	  to	  dictate	  a	  single	  unique	  ontology.	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the	  next	  section),	  however	  much	  claims	  about	  causation	  figures	  in	  ongoing	  debates	  within	  the	  mechanisms	  literature.	  Williamson’s	  (2011)	  criterion	  for	  being	  a	  mechanistic	  theory	  of	  causality,	  that	  “two	  events	  are	  causally	  connected	  if	  and	  only	  if	  they	  are	  connected	  by	  an	  underlying	  physical	  mechanism	  of	  the	  appropriate	  sort”	  (421),	  is	  not	  met	  by	  mechanisms1.	  	  	  The	  anti-­‐reductive	  aspect	  of	  mechanisms1	  generates	  questions	  about	  interlevel	  causation;	  this	  is	  a	  debate	  concerning	  causal	  relationships	  within	  mechanisms1,	  not	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  causation	  per	  se.	  The	  nested,	  hierarchical	  structure	  of	  mechanisms	  allows	  for	  non-­‐arbitrary	  ways	  to	  individuate	  levels	  in	  the	  world,	  in	  a	  local	  and	  context-­‐sensitive	  rather	  than	  broad	  or	  generally	  applicable	  way.	  It	  also	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  direct	  causal	  relationships	  between	  entities	  or	  processes	  at	  different	  levels	  are	  possible.3	  Craver	  and	  Bechtel	  (2007)	  reject	  the	  possibility	  of	  interlevel	  causation.	  They	  argue	  for	  a	  differentiation	  of	  levels	  such	  that	  it	  is	  only	  meaningful	  to	  speak	  of	  higher	  and	  lower	  levels	  within	  a	  single	  given	  mechanism.	  The	  levels	  in	  a	  mechanism	  form	  a	  hierarchy	  structured	  by	  the	  constitutive	  relationships	  between	  phenomena	  and	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  them.	  Craver	  and	  Bechtel	  note	  a	  common	  stricture	  on	  causal	  relata,	  such	  that	  parts	  of	  a	  whole	  cannot	  directly	  enter	  into	  causal	  relationships	  with	  that	  whole.	  They	  conclude	  that	  there	  is	  no	  meaningful	  way	  to	  speak	  of	  causal	  relationships	  between	  different	  levels	  within	  a	  mechanism.	  Either	  those	  relationships	  must	  be	  non-­‐causal	  and	  constitutive,	  or	  they	  must	  not	  be	  between	  genuinely	  different	  levels,	  since	  they	  occur	  between	  different	  mechanisms	  and	  levels	  are	  only	  defined	  within	  individual	  mechanisms.	  	  	  This	  conclusion,	  however,	  is	  in	  tension	  with	  much	  scientific	  practice,	  where	  levels	  are	  often	  treated	  as	  robust	  differentiations	  across	  multiple	  mechanisms.	  Mitchell	  (2008)	  provides	  a	  number	  of	  examples	  of	  what	  she	  calls	  multilevel	  causation	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  There	  are	  many	  ways	  to	  construe	  levels;	  Craver	  (2007)	  offers	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  field	  guide	  to	  many	  of	  those	  ways.	  Here,	  I	  focus	  on	  levels	  within	  a	  mechanism,	  which	  are	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  nested	  mechanisms.	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explanation,	  where	  causal	  relationships	  connect	  levels	  in	  complex	  systems.	  This	  complexity	  of	  causal	  interaction	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  actual	  explanatory	  practices	  of	  the	  sciences,	  as	  she	  illustrates	  with	  case	  studies.	  This	  puts	  the	  onus	  on	  those	  who	  would	  deny	  interlevel	  causal	  relationships	  to	  explain	  away	  the	  apparently	  wide-­‐spread	  attribution	  of	  such	  relationships	  by	  scientists	  who	  work	  on	  complex	  systems.	  	  The	  dispute	  about	  interlevel	  causation	  and	  mechanisms1	  can	  be	  resolved	  by	  clarifying	  a	  wide-­‐spread	  type-­‐token	  ambiguity	  with	  respect	  to	  mechanisms1	  .	  An	  apparently	  integral	  part	  of	  why	  mechanisms1	  are	  so	  useful	  in	  the	  sciences	  is	  that	  an	  explanation	  involving	  a	  mechanism1	  might	  involve	  a	  token	  of	  a	  mechanism,	  or	  of	  a	  type	  of	  mechanism;	  it	  might	  explain	  a	  token	  occurrence	  of	  a	  phenomenon,	  or	  explain	  a	  type	  of	  phenomenon.	  Explanations	  providing	  a	  mechanism	  are	  often	  ambiguous	  regarding	  this	  distinction.	  A	  mechanism1	  may	  indicate	  a	  type	  of	  mechanism,	  such	  as	  a	  calcium	  ion	  channel,	  or	  a	  particular	  mechanism,	  such	  as	  this	  calcium	  ion	  channel.	  Explanations	  of	  token	  instances	  of	  mechanisms1	  explain	  those	  occurrences	  by	  referring	  to	  them	  as	  of	  a	  particular	  type,	  namely,	  the	  general	  mechanism1	  type.	  Sometimes	  the	  target	  explanandum	  is	  just	  one	  single	  channel	  in	  one	  cell	  in	  vitro	  in	  a	  lab.	  But	  more	  often,	  it	  is	  the	  regularly	  recurring	  phenomenon	  that	  is	  displayed	  in	  multiple	  instances	  of	  channels,	  in	  any	  such	  channel	  in	  any	  cell.	  The	  generality	  of	  the	  mechanism	  does	  the	  explanatory	  work	  in	  the	  individual	  cases,	  while	  general	  explanations	  are	  developed	  via	  individual	  cases.	  This	  allows	  us	  to	  disentangle	  two	  different	  claims	  regarding	  interlevel	  causation.	  Types	  of	  sub-­‐mechanisms	  at	  different	  levels	  within	  a	  single	  nesting	  mechanism-­‐type	  may	  violate	  the	  stricture	  against	  self-­‐causation,	  while	  different	  tokens	  of	  those	  same	  sub-­‐mechanism	  types	  might	  be	  perfectly	  acceptable	  causal	  relata.	  	  This	  brings	  us	  to	  a	  key	  feature	  of	  mechanisms1	  by	  which	  they	  can	  be	  distinguished	  from	  other	  senses,	  especially	  from	  mechanisms2.	  Mechanisms1	  are	  characterized	  in	  part	  by	  regularity.	  Mechanisms1	  are	  the	  kinds	  of	  things	  that	  do	  or	  straightforwardly	  could	  recur.	  Accounts	  of	  mechanisms1	  are	  developed	  with	  an	  eye	  towards	  contemporary	  scientific	  practice,	  in	  what	  are	  often	  called	  the	  special	  sciences,	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focused	  on	  methodology,	  experimentation,	  and	  explanatory	  practices	  in	  those	  sciences.	  In	  this	  regard,	  mechanisms	  are	  agnostic	  with	  respect	  to,	  for	  instance,	  physics.	  It	  may	  be	  that	  the	  deductive-­‐nomological	  model	  best	  accounts	  for	  explanatory	  practices	  in	  fundamental	  physics;	  the	  criticisms	  of	  the	  D-­‐N	  model	  that	  led	  to	  the	  new	  mechanisms	  approach	  highlight	  how	  that	  model	  is	  inadequate	  for	  
some	  sciences,	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  alternative	  that	  works	  best	  within	  those	  sciences.	  The	  regularity	  involved	  in	  mechanism1	  ties	  it	  to	  the	  sciences.	  Rather	  than	  studying	  unique,	  singular	  causal	  events,	  the	  sciences	  study	  phenomena	  that	  are	  repeatable,	  or	  studies	  unique	  events	  (such	  as	  speciation	  events)	  as	  potentially	  repeatable.	  	  	  This	  close	  tie	  to	  scientific	  practice,	  however,	  disconnects	  mechanisms1	  from	  earlier	  discussions	  of	  mechanism.	  Historically,	  mechanisms	  were	  part	  of	  a	  complete	  mechanistic	  worldview:	  the	  entire	  world	  (or	  at	  least,	  the	  material	  parts	  of	  it)	  was	  viewed	  as	  mechanistic	  in	  character.	  The	  new	  mechanisms	  literature	  offers	  a	  view	  of	  mechanisms1	  that	  differs	  from	  this	  historical	  discussion	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  completeness	  of	  the	  associated	  ontology.	  Because	  mechanisms1	  guide	  and	  structure	  research	  methodology	  and	  scientific	  explanations,	  they	  provide	  constraints	  on	  our	  ontological	  commitments:	  it	  should	  turn	  out	  that	  those	  scientific	  practices	  largely	  constitute	  a	  well-­‐established	  epistemological	  method	  for	  investigating	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  world.	  But	  scientific	  practice	  does	  not	  constrain	  enough	  to	  pronounce	  one	  or	  another	  account	  of	  ontology	  or	  causation	  as	  the	  one	  to	  which	  we	  should	  be	  committed;	  it	  leave	  room	  for	  agnosticism	  in	  these	  regards.	  For	  a	  complete	  ontology	  based	  on	  mechanisms,	  including	  explanations	  of	  singular	  events	  as	  singular,	  one	  looks	  to	  mechanisms2	  instead.	  	  	  	  
2) Mechanism2:	  Mechanisms	  as	  an	  ontology	  of	  the	  world	  	  	  This	  species	  of	  mechanism2	  has	  re-­‐entered	  the	  discussion	  in	  philosophy	  of	  science	  as	  part	  of	  the	  discussion	  of	  mechanisms1,	  but	  has	  several	  features	  that	  render	  it	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more	  than	  a	  mere	  variation	  on	  mechanisms1.	  Mechanism2	  provides	  a	  metaphysical	  picture	  of	  the	  world	  as	  comprised	  of	  hierarchically	  structured	  layers	  of	  mechanisms,	  each	  mechanism	  constituted	  by	  a	  layer	  of	  smaller	  mechanisms	  and	  their	  entities	  and	  interactions,	  and	  partially	  constituting	  further	  layers.	  None	  of	  these	  layers	  need	  be	  fundamental,	  in	  terms	  of	  being	  the	  ‘real’	  one	  from	  which	  the	  rest	  are	  derivative.	  Rather,	  the	  ontology	  involves	  taking	  the	  whole	  hierarchy	  of	  constitutively	  structured	  layers	  of	  causation,	  each	  of	  which	  is	  genuinely	  real,	  and	  none	  of	  which	  need	  be	  treated	  as	  most	  basic	  (Glennan	  2010a).	  Elucidating	  the	  mechanism(s)2	  that	  instantiates	  a	  particular	  higher-­‐level	  property	  is	  not	  equivalent	  to	  reducing	  the	  higher-­‐level	  property	  to	  a	  lower-­‐level	  mechanism.	  	  	  The	  ontological	  commitments	  of	  mechanism2	  are	  well-­‐defined:	  it	  aims	  to	  provide	  a	  complete	  ontology	  of	  what	  there	  is,	  along	  with	  a	  complete	  account	  of	  causation.	  Mechanism2	  fits	  Williamson’s	  (2011)	  description	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  a	  complex-­‐systems	  account	  of	  mechanistic	  causality.	  Ontologically,	  any	  causal	  chain	  in	  the	  world,	  at	  any	  level,	  counts	  as	  a	  mechanism,	  even	  if	  it	  could	  in	  principle	  only	  occur	  once.	  When	  coupled	  with	  the	  anti-­‐reductive	  focus,	  mechanisms2	  also	  provide	  an	  account	  of	  causation.	  Each	  mechanism	  involves	  causal	  interactions	  between	  entities	  within	  it;	  when	  we	  look	  closer	  at	  these	  causal	  interactions,	  we	  find	  a	  sub-­‐mechanism	  that	  gives	  rise	  to	  it.	  This	  yields	  a	  richly	  causal	  layered	  view	  of	  the	  world	  (Glennan	  2010a),	  where	  it’s	  mechanisms	  all	  the	  way	  down.	  	  Corresponding	  to	  the	  stronger	  ontological	  commitments	  of	  mechanism2	  is	  a	  weaker	  set	  of	  methodological	  implications	  for	  how	  the	  world	  so	  pictured	  should	  be	  investigated.	  Unlike	  the	  advisory	  details	  offered	  to	  scientists	  by	  Darden,	  Craver,	  Bechtel,	  Richardson,	  and	  others	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  mechanisms2	  do	  not	  yield	  specific	  guidance	  regarding	  scientific	  investigation,	  other	  than	  the	  broad	  understanding	  that	  the	  world	  has	  this	  kind	  of	  layered	  causal	  and	  constitutive	  character.	  Finally,	  mechanism2	  offers	  a	  reason	  why	  some	  explanations	  are	  explanatory:	  namely,	  because	  they	  involve	  models	  of	  mechanisms2	  that	  track	  or	  pick	  out	  the	  correct	  underlying	  structure	  of	  the	  world.	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  With	  respect	  to	  explanation,	  mechanism2	  is	  a	  generalization	  of	  mechanism1,	  minus	  the	  regularity	  requirement	  such	  that	  target	  phenomena	  recur	  under	  appropriate	  conditions.	  Because	  any	  causal	  chain	  will	  meet	  the	  criteria	  to	  be	  mechanistic2	  in	  character,	  there	  need	  be	  nothing	  fundamentally	  different	  about	  explaining	  unique	  events	  that	  cannot	  be	  repeated,	  such	  as	  major	  historical	  occurrences,	  and	  explaining	  events	  in	  terms	  of	  types	  that	  regularly	  recur,	  such	  as	  firings	  of	  neurons.	  While	  there	  are	  many	  authors	  who	  espouse	  a	  mechanistic2	  worldview,	  one	  recent	  example	  is	  particularly	  illuminating	  for	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  explicitly	  connects	  mechanism1	  with	  mechanism2.	  Glennan	  (2010b)	  expands	  and	  modifies	  an	  account	  of	  mechanism1	  in	  the	  sciences	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  single	  account	  of	  explanation	  that	  includes	  both	  scientific	  explanations	  of	  regularities	  as	  well	  as	  what	  he	  calls	  historical	  explanations	  of	  singular	  causal	  events.	  He	  characterizes	  the	  difference	  between	  scientific	  and	  historical	  explanations	  purely	  in	  terms	  of	  regularity:	  historical	  explanations	  are	  for	  phenomena	  that	  only	  occur	  once,	  while	  scientific	  explanations	  are	  for	  phenomena	  that	  occur	  more	  than	  once.	  Thus,	  there	  could	  be	  historical	  explanations	  of	  singular	  events	  in	  science,	  and	  scientific	  explanations	  of	  recurrent	  historical	  events.	  Glennan	  argues	  that	  the	  similarity	  between	  them	  is	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  can	  still	  provide	  a	  series	  of	  causal	  events,	  described	  at	  the	  right	  grain,	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  either	  kind	  of	  event.	  Rather	  than	  simply	  calling	  these	  explanations	  causal	  relationships,	  leaving	  open	  the	  character	  of	  causation	  that	  is	  involved,	  we	  should	  say	  they	  involve	  mechanisms2.	  This	  means	  that,	  compared	  with	  mechanism1,	  mechanism2	  strengthens	  the	  ontological	  commitments	  by	  providing	  a	  complete	  account	  of	  causation,	  ruling	  out	  counterfactual	  or	  difference-­‐making	  accounts	  of	  causation.	  	  While	  this	  in	  many	  ways	  offers	  a	  smooth	  transition	  from	  mechanism1	  in	  scientific	  explanation	  to	  mechanism2	  in	  explanation	  generally,	  it	  crosses	  a	  divide	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  sense	  of	  mechanism	  at	  play.	  The	  existence	  of	  some	  kind	  of	  regularity	  requirement	  is	  the	  key	  to	  distinguishing	  mechanism2	  from	  mechanism1.	  When	  some	  sort	  of	  regularity	  requirement	  is	  in	  place,	  there	  will	  exist	  causal	  relationships	  that	  are	  not	  part	  of	  any	  mechanism1	  (Andersen	  2011).	  Such	  ‘historical’	  cases	  simply	  fall	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outside	  the	  ambit	  of	  explanation	  by	  mechanisms1.	  If	  one	  removes	  the	  regularity	  requirement,	  mechanisms	  can	  be	  used	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  a	  complete	  ontology	  of	  the	  world	  and	  account	  of	  causation.	  In	  doing	  so,	  however,	  they	  lose	  much	  of	  what	  made	  them	  useful	  as	  a	  characterization	  of	  scientific	  practice.	  With	  few	  exceptions,	  mechanisms	  are	  explanatorily	  powerful	  in	  the	  sciences	  precisely	  because	  they	  recur:	  regular	  phenomena	  are	  the	  main	  explanatory	  targets,	  and	  explanations	  pointing	  to	  those	  regularities	  are	  powerful	  because	  they	  work	  for	  so	  many	  token	  occurrences.	  Strategies	  for	  mechanism	  discovery	  such	  as	  those	  offered	  by	  Bechtel,	  Richardson,	  Darden,	  and	  Craver	  would	  not	  work	  for	  ephemeral	  mechanisms2,	  since	  they	  cannot	  be	  the	  object	  of	  repeated	  experiments	  and	  are	  only	  tokens,	  not	  types	  (see	  discussion	  in	  previous	  section).	  Characterizing	  mechanisms1	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  role	  in	  the	  sciences	  requires	  a	  different	  account	  than	  characterizing	  all	  causal	  relationships	  as	  mechanistic2	  in	  character.	  	  	  The	  close	  connection	  between	  explanation	  and	  causation	  is	  widely	  recognized;	  thus,	  it	  is	  somewhat	  counterintuitive	  and	  philosophically	  informative	  to	  find	  that	  there	  is	  a	  meaningful	  distinction	  between	  mechanisms2	  as	  an	  account	  of	  causation	  and	  ontology	  and	  mechanisms1	  as	  an	  account	  of	  scientific	  explanation.	  	  	  	  	  
3) Conclusion	  	  Mechanisms	  in	  the	  two	  senses	  discussed	  in	  this	  paper	  provide	  a	  layered	  view	  of	  phenomena	  that	  rejects	  the	  reductionism	  that	  was	  the	  hallmark	  of	  much	  of	  philosophy	  of	  science	  during	  the	  20th	  century.	  Both	  mechanism1	  and	  mechanism2	  are	  characterized	  in	  terms	  of	  entities	  and	  the	  causal	  activities	  that	  connect	  them	  at	  a	  level,	  plus	  constitutive	  relationships	  that	  nest	  upwards	  and	  downwards.	  They	  are	  primarily	  distinguished	  from	  each	  other	  by	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  mechanisms	  are	  regular	  or	  general.	  If	  they	  are,	  then	  they	  are	  mechanisms1,	  and	  will	  be	  further	  characterized	  by	  an	  emphasis	  on	  scientific	  practice,	  providing	  methodological	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recommendations	  for	  investigation,	  playing	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  scientific	  explanations,	  and	  a	  compatibility	  with	  ontological	  agnosticism.	  If	  they	  are	  not	  required	  to	  be	  regular,	  they	  are	  mechanisms2,	  and	  can	  provide	  a	  complete	  ontology	  of	  the	  world	  in	  term	  of	  layered	  causal	  chains,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  metaphysics	  rather	  than	  details	  of	  scientific	  practice,	  and	  will	  be	  suitable	  for	  use	  in	  many	  kinds	  of	  explanation,	  scientific	  as	  well	  as	  historical.	  	  We’ve	  seen	  that	  mechanisms1	  do	  not	  meet	  Williamson’s	  (2011)	  criteria	  to	  be	  a	  mechanistic	  theory	  of	  causation,	  while	  mechanisms2	  do.	  Williamson	  notes	  how	  mechanistic	  views	  of	  the	  world	  stretch	  back	  at	  least	  to	  the	  early	  modern	  period.	  This	  is	  revealing	  of	  something	  very	  important	  in	  the	  contemporary	  discussion	  of	  mechanisms	  in	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  Mechanisms1	  are	  really	  a	  novel	  development,	  as	  a	  focused	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  for	  a	  proper	  subset	  of	  causal	  relationships	  in	  the	  world.	  By	  contrast,	  mechanisms2	  have	  a	  much	  closer	  relationship	  to	  the	  historical	  discussion	  of	  mechanisms,	  and	  arguably	  constitute	  a	  contemporary	  continuation	  of	  the	  early	  modern	  tradition.	  	  	  The	  different	  relationships	  to	  causation	  have	  further	  ramifications	  for	  how	  each	  sense	  figures	  in,	  for	  instance,	  explanation.	  In	  section	  2,	  I	  noted	  an	  ambiguity	  in	  mechanisms1	  with	  respect	  to	  types	  versus	  tokens:	  when	  we	  offer	  a	  mechanism	  to	  explain	  some	  event,	  it	  may	  not	  be	  specified	  whether	  the	  mechanism	  doing	  the	  explaining	  is	  a	  token	  instance	  or	  the	  general	  type.	  This	  ambiguity	  is	  not	  present	  in	  mechanisms2.	  This	  ambiguity	  with	  respect	  to	  types	  versus	  tokens	  leads	  to	  a	  range	  of	  further	  disagreements	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  mechanisms	  and	  causation.	  	  	  This	  taxonomic	  distinction	  between	  mechanisms	  has	  substantial	  philosophical	  consequences	  for	  some	  of	  the	  debates	  discussed	  in	  this	  paper.	  For	  instance,	  the	  debate	  about	  the	  role	  of	  regularity	  in	  mechanisms	  concerns	  two	  distinct	  senses	  of	  the	  term,	  while	  the	  debate	  about	  start-­‐up	  and	  termination	  conditions	  versus	  cycles	  occurs	  within	  a	  single	  sense.	  From	  outside	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  it	  can	  be	  easy	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  ‘new	  mechanisms’	  that	  are	  the	  focus	  of	  so	  much	  discussion	  bear	  a	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much	  closer	  relationship	  to	  the	  historical	  discussion	  than	  they	  actually	  do.	  For	  that,	  one	  should	  look	  to	  mechanisms2.	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